Where did the Ground Combat Vehicle come from and what is it? In 2009, the US Army announced its intention to “significantly restructure” it’s Future Combat System” (FCS). This was formally announced by the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates. The FCS was a program being developed since the year 2000. It was to be a multi-billion dollar program which would be implemented over a period of several years, and one of the salient features of this program was the Manned Ground Vehicle, (MGV).
However, the development of the MGV was cancelled and replaced by another vehicle called the “Ground Combat Vehicle” (GCV), to replace the then existing M113s and the Bradley. The features were obviously planned to be better than the Bradley, in all respects.
Features of the Ground Combat Vehicle
The basic philosophy behind the GCV was that it should be possible to add capabilities on to it in the future, including development of armor. Further, the vehicle should be adaptable to both existing as well as future network capabilities like jammers, radar and sensors. Furthermore, it should be integrated with mature technologies. The vehicle was expected to be in the field by the year 2017, at the latest. The capacity was expected to be a total of 13 soldiers, which would have been more that the capacity of 9 in the M2 Bradley. A common chassis would enable variants to be built around the base structure. The vehicle would also have modular armor, which could be added and removed according to combat requirements. The propulsion system would be an E-X Drive hybrid electric that would deliver high power torque.
Setbacks and Budget Cuts
Originally, once the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) had been carried out by the army, and no other alternative contractors had been located, two contracts of $439.7 million and $449.9 million were awarded to two contractors, General Dynamics and BAE Systems, Nothrop Grumman respectively. Firms like Lockheed Martin, MTU, Detroit Diesel, Raytheon, Rheinmetall Defence, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, SAIC and Boeing were also in the fray.
In 2010, a Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued. Under the deadlines of this RFP, companies were given up to January 2011 for proposals to be submitted for tracked or wheeled vehicles. The Army put a ceiling on the cost per vehicle to a range between $9 million to $10.5 million. The cost of each operational mile was to be $200. The vehicle was also required to fit on a C-17 transport aircraft. 1,874 vehicles had been planned, with the first ones being run off the production line in April 2018.
However, there were several clauses that the Army introduced, that would put the companies in extremely deep water, if there were any glitches in the production. For instance, there was a $450 million ceiling per company and if there was any further rise in the cost, 100% of the additional cost would have to borne by the contractor.
Further deterioration of the program occurred with Boeing protesting about its rejected proposals. The Army defended its case by stating that it had requested certain technical details from Boeing, but the company did not come forward. A total of 20 weaknesses of Boeing were identified, but according to the Army, the company did not address them adequately.
The program was officially called off on 24 February 2014, as confirmed by the Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel.
Potential of the Ground Combat Vehicle
If the GCV had been continued, would it, and how would it have benefited the Army? In 2009, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales (Ret.) wrote an article for the Armed Forces Journal. In his article, A Vehicle for Modern Times, Scales brings to the fore the burning issue of the state of the US Army’s ground forces. He feels that the GCV would be able to bring about the much-needed modernization of the US Army’s ground forces. He feels that the GCV could influence the way all other support systems of the war machine work, like sensors, network, aircraft and fire support. Scales makes a lucid observation that it is unfortunate that drastic changes are usually brought in as a consequence to the death of soldiers.
When the Stykers and Land Warriors were introduced, Scales says, they played different roles, such as long-range and short range transporters, firepower platforms, rally points or even rest centers. He says that the development of a land vehicle effectively resistant to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) abundantly found in Afghanistan is far from satisfactory. He says that loading on armor has got its limitations; the balance has to be struck between offering sufficient protection and making the vehicle to unwieldy and overweight due to excessive armor. This is one good thing that the GCV has going for it.
Scales hits the nail on the head by stating that Soldiers and Marines have paid a heavy price in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Ground Combat Vehicle program he feels, would give them back what they have lost. He concludes the article with a powerful summation by saying, “Let’s get on with giving them the fighting system they deserve.”
